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Masters of Their Domains:
Trademark Holders Now Have New
Ways to Control Their Marks in
Cyberspace
I. INTRODUCTION
On November 29, 1999, President Clinton signed the Anti-
cybersquatting Consumer Protection Act (ACPA) into law.' The
ACPA was designed to prevent a practice that has become known
as cybersquatting.2 Cybersquatting is the common term for the
practice of registering an Internet domain name that is similar or
identical to a trademark of another.3 Domain names are the
catchy words ending in "dot com" that we have all been exposed to
with increasing frequency as the Internet has continued its expan-
sion.4 They are necessary because as humans, we are not capable
of dealing with the addresses that the Internet network actually
1. See Anticybersquatting Consumer Protection Act of 1999, Pub. L. No. 106-
113, §§ 3001-06, 3008, 113 Stat 1501, 1501A-545 to -551 (1999).
2. "The purpose of the bill is to protect consumers and American business...
by prohibiting the bad-faith and abusive registration of distinctive marks as In-
ternet domain names with the intent to profit from the goodwill associated with
such marks-a practice commonly known as cybersquatting." S. Rep. No. 106-140,
at 4 (1999). Accord H.R. Rep. No. 106-412, at 5 (1999).
3. The term cybersquatting comes from a combination of the colloquial term
for the Internet, cyberspace, and a squatter, which is defined as "one who settles
on another's land, without legal title or authority." Blacks Law Dictionary 1403
(6th ed. 1990). A number of different terms have been used to describe this activ-
ity. In fact, the House and Senate versions of the ACPA originally used different
terminology. See S. 1255, 106th Cong. § 1 (1999) ("The Anticybersquatting Con-
sumer Protection Act") (emphasis added); H.R. 3028, 106th Cong. § 1 (1999)
("Trademark Cyberpiracy Prevention Act") (emphasis added). The final version of
the Act settled on the word cybersquatting throughout its provisions. See Anti-
cybersquatting Consumer Protection Act §§ 3001-06, 3008, 113 Stat 1501, 1501A-
545 to -551.
4. See generally Brookfield Communications, Inc. v. W. Coast Entertainment
Corp., 174 F.3d 1036, 1044-45 (9th Cir. 1999) (describing how the World Wide
Web, domain names and domain name registrars work).
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uses to identify computers. 5 These true addresses, known as IP
addresses, are groups of numbers separated by periods. 6 For ex-
ample, when you are looking for information about the President
and type <www.whitehouse.gov> 7 into your web browser, it is in-
stantly converted into 198.137.240.91, its numeric equivalent.
Since these numbers are difficult to remember, a central database
maintains a list of the IP addresses and their domain name
equivalents.8 The important reality is that within each top-level
domain, 9 the use of any individual domain name is exclusive. 10
Domain name registrations are assigned to persons paying a fee
and filling out a registration form on a first come, first serve ba-
sis."' A desirable domain name registration can have substantial
value to an Internet company. For example, a Houston, Texas en-
trepreneur recently sold the domain name <business.com> for 7.5
million dollars. 12 The potential profit, compared to the low $35 ex-
pense needed to tie up a domain name,13 makes cybersquatting a
very profitable activity for the lucky few that can anticipate the
needs of e-businesses. The value a specific domain name can have
to a business, shown clearly by the price paid for <business.com>,
5. See Porsche Cars N. Am., Inc. v. Porsch.com, 51 F. Supp.2d 707, 708-09
(E.D. Va. 1999).
6. See id.
7. In this note, Internet domain names and addresses are set off by the "<"
and ">" symbols to avoid confusion.
8. See Thomas R. Lee, In rem Jurisdiction in Cyberspace, 75 Wash. L. Rev.
97, 102 n.27 (2000).
9. A domain name is broken into three or more parts, separated by periods.
A computer processing a domain name reads these sections from right to left.
Therefore, the last three letters are known as a top level domain. The assignment
of these top level domains is done by the type of organization or person to whom it
is registered. Thus <.com> addresses are assigned to commercial users while
<.gov> domains are assigned to federal government entities. See generally, Avery
Dennison Corp. v. Sumpton, 189 F.3d 868, 872 (9th Cir. 1999) (providing a general
overview of the domain name registration system).
10. See Network Solutions, Inc., Frequently Asked Questions (visited Dec 22,
1999) <http://www. networksolutions.com/help/general.html>.
11. See Sporty's Farm L.L.C. v. Sportsman's Mkt., Inc., 202 F.3d 489, 492-93
(2d Cir. 2000).
12. See Andrew Pollack, What's in a Cybername? $7.5 Million for the Right
Address, N.Y. Times, Dec. 1, 1999, at C8.
13. Network Solutions' registration fee is $35 per year with a one-year mini-
mum. See Network Solutions, Inc., Web Address (With Technical Information)
Pricing (visited Jan. 25, 2000) <http://www.networksolutions. com/catalog/domain-
name/pricing/index.html>.
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explains why domain name controversies are often settled by the
courts.
In order to understand cybersquatting, it is first necessary to
understand exactly what an Internet domain name14 is and how
the Internet uses them to identify computers. One of the first steps
in establishing a business presence on the Internet is to register
what is known as a "top level domain name."15 Most companies
choose their company name or the name of a product that the com-
pany is attempting to promote on the Internet. 16 Often, these com-
pany or product names are trademarks.' 7 In a case of
cybersquatting, when a company searches the database of avail-
able domain names, they discover that someone has already regis-
tered the domain name they were looking for. Typically, when the
company contacts the registrant they are informed by the cyber-
squatter that the company can purchase the domain name for
$10,000, which the cybersquatter is quick to point out, is far less
than the cost of litigating the matter. Since their competitors al-
ready have successful web sites and the company feels it is losing
business by not having an online presence, some companies choose
to give in and pay for the right to use their own trademark on the
Internet.
In response to this practice, and the limited legal remedies
available to victims of cybersquatting that were available at the
time, Congress passed the Anticybersquatting Consumer Protec-
tion Act ("ACPA").i8 This act amends the Lanham Act 19 by creat-
14. The ACPA defines a "domain name" as "any alphanumeric designation
which is registered with or assigned by any domain name registrar, domain name
registry, or other domain name registration authority as part of an electronic ad-
dress on the Internet." Anticybersquatting Consumer Protection Act of 1999, Pub.
L. No. 106-113, § 3005, 113 Stat. 1501, 1501A-550 (1999).
15. Computer network administrators assign every computer attached to the
Internet a unique numerical address known as an IP address. Since these numeric
addresses are difficult to remember, the network administrators can request that a
domain name registry associate a textual address to the computer. These textual
identifiers are the domain names. See generally Sporty's Farm, L.L.C. v. Sports-
man's Mkt., 202 F.3d 489, 492-93 (2d Cir. 2000) (describing the domain name
system).
16. See Beverly v. Network Solutions, Inc., No. C-98-0337-VRW, 1998 WL
320829, at *1 (N.D. Cal. June 12, 1998) ("Companies attempt to make the search
for their web site as easy as possible. They do so by using a corporate name, trade-
mark or service mark as their web site address.).
17. See id.
18. See Anticybersquatting Consumer Protection Act §§ 3001-06, 3008, 113
Stat. 1501, 1501A-545 to -551,
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ing a specific cause of action for cybersquatting.20  The added
provisions provide for the election of statutory damages of $1,000
to $100,000 per domain name, to be determined by the court. 21 In
addition, the act establishes in rem jurisdiction, allowing a trade-
mark owner to file an action against the domain name itself when
the registering person cannot be properly served.22 Finally, the
ACPA provides protection to a domain name registering author-
ity.23 It does so by limiting domain name registrar's liability for
wrongfully canceling or altering a domain name registration in re-
sponse to a court order, or due to a policy designed to prevent the
registration of a domain name that is similar to another's mark.24
Before the enactment of the ACPA the most successful remedy
available to the victims of cybersquatting was the use of federal
trademark law.25 If the victim of cybersquatting was using the do-
main name in question as a trademark, he could sue under a trade-
mark infringement or a trademark dilution theory. This approach
was generally successful, particularly in the most egregious cases
of cybersquatting. However, Congress was not satisfied with the
use of traditional trademark law and enacted the ACPA to provide
for a specific cause of action for cybersquatting. 26 Congress chose
to include this cybersquatting cause of action within the provisions
of the Lanham Act and consequently the ACPA mirrors much of
the language of the Lanham Act's trademark infringement and
trademark dilution provisions. 27 Since the use of trademark law
19. 15 U.S.C §§ 1051-1127 (1994).
20. See Anticybersquatting Consumer Protection Act of 1999, Pub. L. No. 106-
113, § 3002, 113 Stat. 1501, 1501A-545 to -546 (1999) (to be codified at 15 U.S.C.
§ 1125(d)(1)(A)).
21. See id. § 3003, 113 Stat. at 1501A-549 (to be codified at 15 U.S.C.
§ 1117(d)).
22. See id. § 3002, 113 Stat. at 1501A-547 (to be codified at 15 U.S.C.
§ 1125(d)(2)(A)).
23. A database of domain names and their numeric IP address equivalents
along with identifying and ownership information is maintained by registration
agencies. These agencies handle the registration and domain name assignment
process for in exchange for a registration fee. See generally Sporty's Farm, L.L.C.
v. Sportsman's Mkt., 202 F.3d 489, 492-93 (2d Cir. 2000) (describing the domain
name system).
24. See Anticybersquatting Consumer Protection Act § 3004, 113 Stat. at
1501A-549 (to be codified at 15 U.S.C. § 1114(D)(i)-(ii)).
25. See H.R. Rep. No. 106-412, at 6 (1999).
26. See id. at 5-7.
27. See Anticybersquatting Consumer Protection Act §§ 3001-06, 3008, 113
Stat. 1501, 1501A-545 to -551; 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a)-(c) (1994 & Supp. III 1997).
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had been the most successful method of fighting cybersquatting,
amending trademark law to include cybersquatting seems like a
logical solution.
In reality however, the quirk of the Internet that makes cyber-
squatting possible (the fact that only one person can use any one
domain name at a given time) also conflicts with some basic con-
cepts inherent to trademark law making its application a poor fit
at best. The attempts by Congress to fit cybersquatting into the
existing framework of Federal trademark law creates a situation
whereby a trademark use which might be non-infringing in the
everyday world becomes actionable under the ACPA when it is
used as a domain name. Consequently, the ACPA has granted
trademark owners more control over the use of their marks as do-
main names than they have for any other use. It is this conflict
between the new provisions of the ACPA and the traditional limi-
tations of trademark protection and the potential for the abuse of
these new protections by trademark holders that is the scope of
this comment.
Part II of this comment discusses the new options available to
trademark holders with the passing of the ACPA. Part III de-
scribes how the courts applied trademark law to cybersquatting
cases before Congress enacted the ACPA. Part IV discusses how
the ACPA has modified traditional trademark principles in order
to apply trademark law to a uniquely Internet-specific problem. In
doing so, the ACPA continues a modern trend of moving trademark
law further away from its roots of avoiding consumer confusion.
Instead of protecting consumers, the ACPA provides trademark
owners with new strong protections that allow them unprece-
dented control over the use of their trademarks as domain names.
II. THE ANTICYBERSQUATTING CONSUMER PROTECTION ACT
A. Cybersquatting as Defined by the ACPA
The ACPA is intended to "prohibit the bad-faith and abusive
registration of distinctive marks as Internet domain names with
the intent to profit from the goodwill associated with such
marks."28 It does so by creating a cause of action by the owner of a
trademark or a personal name, against any person who:
28. H.R. Rep. No. 106-412, at 5 (1999); S. Rep. No. 106-140, at 4 (1999).
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(i) has a bad faith intent to profit from that mark, including a
personal name which is protected as a mark under this sec-
tion; and
(ii) registers, traffics in, or uses a domain name that-
(I) in the case of a mark that is distinctive at the time of
registration of the domain name, is identical or confus-
ingly similar to that mark;
(II) in the case of a famous mark that is famous at the
time of registration of the domain name, identical or con-
fusingly similar to or dilutive of such mark.29
The act extends these anticybersquatting provisions to two trade-
marks already specifically protected by federal law, the emblems of
the Red Cross 30 and certain names and symbols associated with
the United States Olympic Committee. 31 The ACPA also provides
for a civil action that protects individuals who have found that a
cybersquatter registered their own personal name as a domain
name, with the intention of profiting from the name.32
The ACPA's definition of cybersquatting, as it pertains to
trademarks, produces two different standards: one for distinctive
marks, and another more protective standard for famous marks. 33
In order to be protected by the statute, the trademark in question
must be either distinctive, famous or both at the time the offending
domain name was registered. 34 These two terms are not defined
within the ACPA itself.35 Although not specifically defined in the
statute, the term "distinctive" is a term of art within trademark
law. 36 Distinctiveness is the degree of uniqueness that a trade-
29. Anticybersquatting Consumer Protection Act § 3002, 113 Stat. 1501,
1501A-545 to -546 (to be codified at 15 U.S.C. § 1125(d)(1)(A)).
30. See 18 U.S.C. § 706 (1994) (providing criminal penalties for persons wear-
ing or displaying the symbol of the Red Cross without authorization).
31. See 36 U.S.C.A. § 220506 (West Supp. 1999) (granting the United States
Olympic Committee the exclusive right to use certain symbols, including the
Olympic rings, the words Olympic, Olympiad and other Olympic related terms).
32. See Anticybersquatting Consumer Protection Act § 3002, 113 Stat. 1501,
1501A-545 to -546 (to be codified at 15 U.S.C. § 1125(d)(1)(A)).
33. See id.
34. See Anticybersquatting Consumer Protection Act § 3002, 113 Stat. 1501,
1501A-545 to -546 (to be codified at 15 U.S.C. § 1125(d)(1)(A)); Sporty's Farm,
L.L.C. v. Sportsman's Mkt., Inc., 202 F.3d 489, 497 (2d Cir. 2000).
35. See Anticybersquatting Consumer Protection Act §§ 3001-06, 3008, 113
Stat. 1501, 1501A-545 to -551.
36. See Nabisco, Inc. v. PF Brands, Inc., 191 F3d 208, 215 (2d Cir. 1999) (dis-
cussing in detail the various levels of distinctiveness and the degree to which
trademark law protects them).
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mark possesses.37 The relative distinctiveness of a trademark de-
termines the degree of protection it can receive. 38 The term
"famous" is also not defined within the ACPA.39 The ACPA's use of
famousness as a factor in determining trademark protection is
similar to its use in the Federal Trademark Dilution Act,40 (FTDA)
where it is defined. 41
Another integral part of the ACPA is the element of "bad faith"
in the registration of a domain name. It is a required element of
the civil action created by the new 15 U.S.C. § 1125(d). 42 The act
provides the courts with nine factors to help guide their determina-
tion of bad faith.43 However, these factors are simply guidelines,
37. See id.
38. See id.
39. See Anticybersquatting Consumer Protection Act §§ 3001-06, 3008, 113
Stat. 1501, 1501A-545 to -551.
40. 15 U.S.C. § 1125 (c)(1) (Supp. III 1997).
41. See id. The meaning of the terms "distinctive" and "famous" in the ACPA
have yet to be interpreted by a court. The only appellate court to apply the ACPA
at the time of publication did not discuss this issue, and instead deferred to the
trial court's determination that the mark in question was distinctive under the
FTDA. See Sporty's Farm, L.L.C. v. Sportsman's Mkt., Inc., 202 F.3d 489, 497 (2d
Cir. 2000). However, one court has interpreted Sporty's to say that the FTDA's
criteria should be used to determine famousness under the ACPA. See Shields v.
Zuccarini, No 00-494, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3350, at *11 (E.D. Pa. Mar. 22, 2000)
("In Sporty's Farm, the Second Circuit applied the criteria laid out in 15 U.S.C.
§ 1125(c)(1) in making this determination, and we will do the same."). The FTDA
suggests that a court may examine the following factors to be used in determining
famousness:
In determining whether a mark is distinctive and famous, a court may
consider factors such as, but not limited to-.
the degree of inherent or acquired distinctiveness of the mark;
the duration and extent of use of the mark in connection with the
goods or services with which the mark is used;
the duration and extent of advertising and publicity of the mark;
the geographical extent of the trading area in which the mark is used;
the channels of trade for the goods or services with which the mark is
used;
the degree of recognition of the mark in the trading areas and chan-
nels of trade used by the marks' owner and the person against whom
the injunction is sought;
the nature and extent of use of the same or similar marks by third
parties; and
whether the mark was registered under the Act of March 3, 1881, or
the Act of February 20, 1905, or on the principle register.
15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(1) (Supp. 1997).
42. See Anticybersquatting Consumer Protection Act § 3002, 115 Stat. at
1501A-545 (to be codified at 15 U.S.C. § 1125((d)(1)(A)(i)).
43. The act provides that:
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not an all-inclusive list of factors to be used by the courts. 44 This is
apparent in the language of the statute that explains how the
courts should apply these factors. 45 The ACPA provides that when
evaluating bad faith, "a court may consider factors such as, but not
In determining whether a person has a bad faith intent ... a court may
consider factors such as, but not limited to-
(I) the trademark or other intellectual property rights of the person, if
any, in the domain name;
(II) the extent to which the domain name consists of the legal name of
the person or a name that is otherwise commonly used to identify that
person;
(III) the person's prior use, if any, of the domain name in connection
with the bona fide offering of any goods or services;
(IV) the person's bona fide noncommercial or fair use of the mark in a
site accessible under the domain name;
(V) the person's intent to divert consumers from the mark owner's
online location to a site accessible under the domain name that could
harm the goodwill represented by the mark, either for commercial gain or
with the intent to tarnish or disparage the mark, by creating a likelihood
of confusion as to the source, sponsorship, affiliation, or endorsement of
the site;
(VI) the person's offer to transfer, sell, or otherwise assign the domain
name to the mark owner or any third party for financial gain without hav-
ing used, or having an intent to use, the domain name in the bona fide
offering of any goods or services, or the person's prior conduct indicating a
pattern of such conduct;
(VII) the person's provision of material and misleading false contact
information when applying for the registration of the domain name, the
person's intentional failure to maintain accurate contact information, or
the person's prior conduct indicating a pattern of such conduct;
(VIII) the person's registration or acquisition of multiple domain
names which the person knows are identical or confusingly similar to
marks of others that are distinctive at the time of registration of such
domain names, or dilutive of famous marks of others that are famous at
the time of registration of such domain names, without regard to the
goods or services of the parties; and
(IX) the extent to which the mark incorporated in the person's domain
name registration is or is not distinctive and famous within the meaning
of subsection (c) (1) of section 43.
Id. § 3002, 115 Stat. at 1501A-546 (to be codified at 15 U.S.C. § 1125((d)(1)(B)(i)).
44. See id. Anticybersquatting Consumer Protection Act § 3002, 113 Stat.
1501, 1501A-545 to -546 (to be codified at 15 U.S.C. § 1125(d)(1)(A)); H.R. Rep. No.
106-412, at 10; S. Rep. No. 106-140, at 13 (1999). In the words of the Second Cir-
cuit: "We are not limited to considering just the listed factors when making our
determination of whether the [bad faith] criterion has been met. The factors are,
instead, expressly described as indicia that 'may' be considered along with other
facts." Sportys Farm L.L.C. v. Sportsman's Mkt., Inc., 202 F.3d 489, 498 (2d Cir.
2000) (citation omitted).
45. See Anticybersquatting Consumer Protection Act § 3002, 113 Stat. 1501,
1501A-545 to -546 (to be codified at 15 U.S.C. § 1125(d)(1)(A)).
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limited to" the enumerated factors.46 These factors specifically ad-
dress some of the tactics that cybersquatters have used in their
attempts to sell domain names and can be linked back to specific
tactics used by cybersquatters in the past.47
The bad faith factors can be divided into two categories, those
that can be considered by a judge to be evidence of bad faith and
those that tend to show a lack of bad faith.48 In the lack of bad
faith category the court may consider the "the trademark or other
intellectual property rights of the person, if any, in the domain
name."49 This recognizes the fact that the alleged cybersquatter
may himself have an arguable right to use the trademark in ques-
tion. The court may also consider the "extent to which the domain
name consists of the legal name of the person or a name that is
otherwise commonly used to identify that person."50 Thus, the
judge may consider as evidence of a lack of bad faith, the fact that
an individual may simply be using their own name as a domain
name. Another factor showing a lack of bad faith would be the per-
son's prior use of the name "in connection with the bona fide offer-
ing of any goods or services" 51 or the "bona fide noncommercial or
fair use of the mark in a site accessible under the domain name".52
The factors that show bad faith illustrate the ways in which
true cybersquatters have been known to operate. One factor recog-
nizes a form of cybersquatting where a cybersquatter registers a
domain name that is similar to another domain name. This type of
cybersquatter often registers a common misspelling of another do-
main name that a company is already using.53 Cybersquatters
46. Id.
47. See S. Rep. No. 106-140, at 9 (1999) ("Each of these factors reflect indica-
tors that, in practice, commonly reflect bad-faith intent or a lack thereof in cyber-
squatting cases.").
48. See H.R. Rep. No. 106-412, at 10 (1999); S. Rep. No. 106-140, at 9 (1999).
49. See Anticybersquatting Consumer Protection Act § 3002, 113 Stat. 1501,
1501A-545 to -546 (to be codified at 15 U.S.C. § 1125(d)(1)(B)(i)(I)).
50. Id. (to be codified at 15 U.S.C. § 1125(d)(1)(B)(i)(II)).
51. Id. (to be codified at 15 U.S.C. § 1125(d)(1)(B)(i)(III)).
52. Id. (to be codified at 15 U.S.C. § 1125(d)(1)(B)(i)(IV)).
53. See S. Rep. No. 106-140, at 6 (1999). The Senate report cites as an exam-
ple of the attempts of a cybersquatter to divert customers from the site
<www.carpoint.com> by registering the domain name <wwwcarpoint.com> with-
out a period between the "www" and "carpoint." The cybersquatter was relying on
the fact that computer users often forget to insert the necessary period between
"www" and a domain name. By registering <wwwcarpoint.com> the cybersquatter
was able to offer a competing car buying service. See id.
20001
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make these registrations with the hopes that consumers will acci-
dentally access the offending site, instead of the trademark
holder's page.54 The offender often will advertise either similar
competing products or even the trademark holder's products, hop-
ing that consumers will not realize that they are not dealing di-
rectly with the trademark holder.55 The Act specifically addresses
this practice by allowing a trial judge to consider:
the person's intent to divert consumers from the mark
owner's online location to a site accessible under the domain
name that could harm the goodwill represented by the mark,
either for commercial gain or with the intent to tarnish or
disparage the mark by creating a likelihood of confusion as to
the source, sponsorship, affiliation, or endorsement of the
site.56
The next two bad faith factors address the most common ac-
tions that set cybersquatters apart from the typical domain name
registrant. These factors specifically apply to the type of cyber-
squatting that was the basis for an infringement action in Panavi-
sion Int'l, L.P. v. Toeppen,57 discussed in part III of this
comment.58 The court can consider the person's attempts to sell
the domain name without having first used or intending to use it to
offer goods or services. 59 The court can also examine the individ-
ual's prior history of attempting to sell domain names.60 This fac-
tor recognizes the routine practice of attempting to sell domain
names without actually using them, which can be evidence that
helps to separate the innocent user from the true cybersquatter.
Likewise, the court can also look at:
the person's registration or acquisition of multiple domain
names which the person knows are identical or confusingly
similar to marks of others that are distinctive at the time of
registration of such domain names, or dilutive of famous
marks of others that are famous at the time of registration of
54. See id.
55. See Anticybersquatting Consumer Protection Act of 1999, Pub. L. No. 106-
113, § 3002, 113 Stat. 1501, 1501A-545 to -546 (to be codified at 15 U.S.C.
§ 1125(d)(1)(A)).
56. Id. (to be codified at 15 U.S.C. § 1125(d)(1)(B)(i)(IV)).
57. 141 F.3d 1316 (9th Cir. 1998).
58. See text accompanying note 117.
59. Anticybersquatting Consumer Protection Act § 3002, 113 Stat. 1501,
1501A-546 (to be codified at 15 U.S.C. § 1125(d)(1)(B)(VI)).
60. See id.
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such domain names, without regard to the goods or services
of such persons.61
This factor seems to protect the innocent registrant by requir-
ing that the defendant in a cybersquatting claim have knowledge
that the domain name in question was identical or confusingly sim-
ilar to the mark of another.6 2 It also notes that the court should
examine famousness "at the time of registration" of the domain
name in question.63
This can be an important distinction because while a trade-
mark receives protection from uses that are identical or confus-
ingly similar to the trademark, famous marks receive protection
under a more liberal standard.64 To prove cybersquatting for a fa-
mous mark, the plaintiff must show that the trademark is "identi-
cal or confusingly similar to or dilutive of that mark."6 5 This
provides the owner of a famous mark with protection against
cybersquatting that is analogous to the Federal Trademark Dilu-
tion Act (FTDA).66 However, unlike the FDTA, the ACPA does not
define any factors to be considered in determining the famousness
of a mark.67 It is unclear from the text of the legislation what
standards Congress intended the courts to use in determining dilu-
tion under the ACPA. The ACPA further blurs the traditional dis-
tinctions between famous and distinctive trademarks by
61. Id. (to be codified at 15 U.S.C. § 1125(d)(1)(B)(i)(VIII)).
62. Ultimately the application of this factor and all of the others is one for the
courts. The Senate Judiciary Committee Report for S. 1255, 106th Cong. (1999),
which formed the base for what eventually became the ACPA, notes that the bad-
faith factors were drafted to be broad in scope in part because
[Recognizing specific exemptions] would eviscerate the protections of the
bill by suggesting a blueprint for cybersquatters who would simply [con-
form with the exemption] in order to immunize themselves from liability
despite their bad-faith intentions.... Courts must ultimately weigh the
facts of each case and make a determination based on those facts whether
or not the defendant [engaged in cybersquatting]
S. Rep. No. 106-140, at 9-10 (1999). Accord H.R. Rep. No. 106-412, at 10-13 (1999).
While this approach does prevent cybersquatters from avoiding liability by finding
loopholes in the law, it may also result in inconsistent and unpredictable applica-
tion of the ACPA in practice.
63. See Anticybersquatting Consumer Protection Act of 1999, Pub. L. No. 106-
113, § 3002, 113 Stat. 1501, 1501A-545 to -546 (1999) (to be codified at 15 U.S.C.
§ 1125(d)(1)(A)(ii)(I)).
64. See id.
65. Id. (to be codified at 15 U.S.C. § 1125(d)(1)(A)(ii)(II)) (emphasis added).
66. See 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c) (Supp. III 1997). This leaves the courts to deter-
mine the meaning of a famous mark within the framework of the ACPA.
67. See 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(1)(A)-(H) (Supp. III 1997).
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instructing a court to consider "the extent to which the mark incor-
porated in the person's domain name registration is or is not dis-
tinctive and famous within the meaning of [15 U.S.C. 1125(c)]." 68
This places the court in the interesting position of weighing an in-
termediate standard between an ordinary and a famous mark. Fi-
nally, the court can consider "[tihe person's intentional provision of
material and misleading false contact information when applying
for the registration of the domain name."69 This factor recognizes
the reality that cybersquatters often attempt to hide their
identities.
Apart from the nine bad faith factors, the ACPA also provides
for an absolute defense against an action under the cybersquatting
provisions of the ACPA70 . It provides that bad faith may not be
found where the court determines the registrant believed and had
reasonable grounds to believe that he had a fair use or other legal
right to use the domain name.71 This fair use defense is important
because it provides some protection for registrants who may have a
legitimate, legal use for the domain name in question, despite the
fact that some of the bad faith factors may not be in their favor. It
remains to be seen how the courts will apply this defense and what
degree of protection it will provide defendants who do have a fair
use or other legal defense.
B. Remedies Provided by the ACPA
The ACPA creates a specific civil cause of action for the viola-
tion of the ACPA's cybersquatting provisions.7 2 As remedies for
the violation of these provisions, the ACPA provides for injunctive
relief and the election of statutory or actual damages. 73 Conse-
quently, it is no longer necessary for trademark holders to sue
under an infringement or dilution claim to stop a cybersquatter.
Instead, they can now use the specific cause of action provided by
the ACPA. Since the ACPA was designed to provide legal relief for
victims of cybersquatting, its provisions were intended by Con-
68. Anticybersquatting Consumer Protection Act § 3002, 113 Stat. 1501,
1501A-546 (to be codified at 15 U.S.C. § 1125(d)(1)(B)(IX)).
69. Id. (to be codified at 15 U.S.C. § 1125(d)(1)(B)(i)(VII)).
70. See id.
71. See id. (to be codified at 15 U.S.C. § 1125(d)(1)(B)(ii)).
72. See supra text accompanying note 29.
73. See Anticybersquatting Consumer Protection Act § 3003, 113 Stat. 1501,
1501A-548-499 (to be codified at 15 U.S.C. § 1117(d)).
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gress to be applied to cybersquatting cases more easily than the
traditional trademark actions.74
The injunctive relief provisions of the ACPA create no reme-
dies separate from those already available to a victim of trademark
infringement. 75 The act simply extends the injunctive relief provi-
sions of 15 U.S.C. § 1116(a) to violations of the new 15 U.S.C.
§ 1125 (d)(1)(A).76 This allows the court to grant the trademark
owner an injunction "as the court may deem reasonable, to prevent
the violation of any right of the registrant of a mark registered in
the Patent and Trademark Office or to prevent a violation under
section 1125(a) of this title."77
The ACPA also provides for the recovery of actual damages for
infringement under 15 U.S.C. § 1117(a).78 This allows for the re-
covery of the defendants profits, the plaintiffs actual damages, and
court costs. 7 9 At the trial judge's discretion, treble damages may
be awarded and in "exceptional cases" the prevailing party can be
awarded reasonable attorney's fees.80
A major addition to these traditional remedies is found in the
new 15 U.S.C. § 1117(d). Here, the ACPA gives the plaintiff the
option of electing statutory damages in lieu of actual damages.,
The plaintiff may make this decision at any time before final judg-
ment is rendered.8 2 The statutory damage amounts are set at "not
less than $1,000 and not more than $100,000 per domain name, as
the court considers just."83 Since it can be difficult to prove actual
74. See S. Rep. 106-140, at 7-8 (1999).
75. See Anticybersquatting Consumer Protection Act § 3003, 113 Stat. 1501,
1501A-548.
76. See id. ("INJUNCTIONS.-Section 34(a) of the Trademark Act of 1946 (15
U.S.C. 1116(a)) is amended in the first sentence by striking '(a) or (c)' and inserting
'(a), (c), or (d).-).
77. 15 U.S.C. § 1116(a) (1994).
78. See Anticybersquatting Consumer Protection Act § 3003, 113 Stat. 1501,
1501A-549 ("DAMAGES.-Section 35(a) of the Trademark Act of 1946 (15 U.S.C.
1117(a)) is amended in the first sentence by inserting ', (c), or (d)' after 'section
43(a).'").
79. See 15 U.S.C. § 1117(a) (1994).
80. See id.
81. See Anticybersquatting Consumer Protection Act § 3003, 113 Stat. 1501,
1501A-549 (to be codified at 15 U.S.C. § 1117(d)).
82. See id.
83. Id.
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damages in cybersquatting cases, this provision makes it easier to
obtain compensation from a cybersquatter.84
C. In Rem Provisions
Since the Federal Trademark Dilution Act does not provide for
in rem jurisdiction against allegedly diluting marks,85 it was some-
times impossible to sue a cybersquatter who provided false infor-
mation to the domain name registering authority. As a result, it
was difficult to find the responsible party and invoke in personam
jurisdiction. 86 In an attempt to limit this problem, the ACPA al-
lows for in rem jurisdiction in certain circumstances.8 7 A mark
owner can obtain in rem jurisdiction over a domain name registra-
tion where the owner of a mark has used "due diligence" in an at-
tempt to locate the domain name registrant or in cases where the
plaintiff cannot exercise in personam jurisdiction over the regis-
trant.8 8 By adding this provision, Congress hoped to:
84. The Senate Judiciary Committee noted that this difficulty in proving ac-
tual damages was a significant obstacle to cybersquatting suits before Congress
enacted the ACPA. See S. Rep. 106-140, at 7 (1999).
85. See Porsche Cars N. Am., Inc. v. Porsch.com, 51 F. Supp.2d 707, 713 (E.D.
Va. 1999).
86. See id. (sustaining a motion to dismiss under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(2) for
lack of personal jurisdiction in an attempt to force the cancellation of an infringing
domain name where the only basis for jurisdiction was in rem).
87. Congress recognized that it is a common practice of cybersquatters to give
false names or addresses to a domain name registration authority to avoid service
of process. Congress specifically drafted the in rem provisions of the ACPA to pro-
vide trademark owners with relief in such cases. See S. Rep. No. 106-140, at 10
(1999).
88. See Anticybersquatting Consumer Protection Act of 1999, Pub. L. No. 106-
113, § 3002, 113 Stat. 1501, 1501A-547 (1999) (to be codified at 15 U.S.C. § 1125
(d)(2)); Caesars World, Inc. v. Caesars-palace.com, No. 99-550-A, 2000 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 2671, at *4-5 (E.D. Va. Mar. 3, 2000). The relevant section provides that:
(A) The owner of a mark may file an in rem civil action against a
domain name in the judicial district in which the domain name registrar,
domain name registry, or other domain name authority that registered or
assigned the domain name is located if -
(i) the domain name violates any right of the owner of a mark.., and
(ii) the court finds that the owner-
(1) is not able to obtain in personam jurisdiction over a person
who would have been a defendant in a civil action under para-
graph (1) by-
(aa) sending a notice of the alleged violation and intent to
proceed under this paragraph to the registrar; and
(bb) publishing notice of the action as the court may direct
promptly after filing the action.
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alleviate this difficulty, while protecting the notions of fair
play and substantial justice, by enabling the mark holder to
seek an injunction against the infringing property in cases
where ... a mark holder is unable to proceed... [because] the
registrant has provided false contact information and is
otherwise not to be found.8 9
The remedies available in an in rem action are not as broad as
those available under the cybersquatting provisions. 90 The act
limits the remedies available to plaintiffs who must make use of
this grant of in rem jurisdiction to a court ordered cancellation of
the offending registration or a transfer to the trademark holder.9 1
There are no damage provisions for an action based upon the in
rem jurisdiction section of the ACPA.9 2 Nonetheless, the addition
of the in rem provision allows the courts to exercise jurisdiction
and cancel registrations that would have been unreachable under
previous law.9 3 Although the use of in rem jurisdiction has consti-
tutional limits, the in rem provisions of the ACPA have survived
their first constitutional challenge. In a recent case, Caesars
World, Inc. v. Caesars-palace.com,9 4 the United States District
Court for the Eastern District of Virginia upheld the constitution-
ality of the ACPA's in rem provisions.9 5 The multiple defendants
in the case had registered variations of the word Caesars as do-
main names.9 6 Although the plaintiffs filed their original action
before the enactment of the ACPA,9 7 the plaintiffs amended their
complaint to assert a claim under the ACPA and to invoke its in
(B) The actions under subparagraph (A)(ii) shall constitute service of
process.
Id.
89. S. Rep. No. 106-140, at 10 (1999).
90. See Anticybersquatting Consumer Protection Act § 3002, 113 Stat. 1501,
1501A-547 (to be codified at 15 U.S.C. § 1125 (d)(2)(D)(i)).
91. See id.
92. See id.
93. For a more detailed discussion of the use of in rem jurisdiction in cyber-
squatting cases and the impact of the ACPA on Internet legal jurisdiction issues,
see Lee, supra note 8.
94. No. 99-550-A, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2671 (E.D. Va. Mar. 3, 2000).
95. See id. at *5-7.
96. The domain names that the defendants registered are an excellent exam-
ple of how cybersquatters often register multiple misspellings of a domain name.
The registrations included: <casares.com>, <caesares.com>, <caesares.net>,
<ceasares.org>, and <caesaeres.org>. See id. at *2 & n.1.
97. See id. at *1-2.
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rem provisions.9 8 The defendants filed a motion asking the court
to dismiss the action for lack of in rem jurisdiction and to declare
the in rem provisions of the ACPA unconstitutional. 99 The court
rejected the defendants arguments and held that under Shaffer v.
Heitner,0 0 a minimum contacts analysis is necessary only when
the cause of action is unrelated to the property located in the forum
state.10 1 The court held that in the case of a domain name dispute,
the domain name "is not only related to the cause of action, but is
its entire subject matter. Accordingly, it is unnecessary for mini-
mum contacts to meet personal jurisdiction standards."10 2 While
these in rem provisions provide plaintiffs in cybersquatting cases
with the tools necessary to bring the cybersquatters to court, other
provisions of the ACPA make formal legal action unnecessary.
D. Limitations on Liability for Domain Name Registration
Agencies
In an attempt to "encourage domain name registrars and re-
gistries to work with trademark owners to prevent cybersquat-
ting,"10 3 the Act grants limited exemptions from monetary
damages to domain name registrars who transfer, cancel, suspend
or disable a domain name registration, provided that they do so
within the provisions of the act. 10 4 The provisions effectively
shield domain name registrars from liability. This leaves domain
name registries with little incentive to be receptive to the claims of
the allegedly infringing registrant.
The Act provides that monetary damages are not available
against a registrar that acts in compliance with a court order or "in
the implementation of a reasonable policy by such registrar ...
prohibiting the registration of a domain name that is identical to,
confusingly similar to or dilutive of another's mark."10 5 This sec-
98. See id.
99. See id.
100. 433 U.S. 186 (1977).
101. See Caesars World, Inc. v. Caesars-palace.com, No. 99-550-A, 2000 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 2671, at *5 (E.D. Va. Mar. 3, 2000).
102. See id.
103. S. Rep. No. 106-140, at 11 (1999).
104. Anticybersquatting Consumer Protection Act of 1999, Pub. L. No. 106-113,
§ 3004, 113 Stat. 1501, 1501A-549 to -550 (1999) (to be codified at 15 U.S.C.
§ 1114(D)(iii)).
105. Id. § 3004, 113 Stat. at 1501A-549 (to be codified at 15 U.S.C.
§ 1114(D)(ii)(II)).
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tion was specifically designed to encourage domain name regis-
trars to implement a reasonable policy to prevent
cybersquatting.' 06 To accomplish this goal, the provisions of the
ACPA encourage domain name registrars to err on the side of the
registrant of a disputed domain name by providing them more pro-
tection against wrongful registration than wrongful cancella-
tion.10 7 Domain name registrars would only be liable for damages
if it were shown that a registration was made with bad faith intent
to profit from the registration.108 The act does attempt to discour-
age false claims of infringement by providing that a person who
makes a "knowing and material misrepresentation ... that a do-
main name is identical to, confusingly similar to, or dilutive of a
mark... shall be liable for any damages, including costs and attor-
ney's fees, incurred by the domain name registrant as a result of
such action."' 0 9 A party whose domain name is cancelled due to an
infringement complaint is not left without any recourse. The act
also provides that the owner of a domain name, cancelled as a re-
sult of the dispute resolution policy of a domain name registry,
may file a civil action challenging the registrar's finding."10 The
remedy for such action is limited to injunctive relief to grant rein-
statement of the domain name to the challenging party."'
These limitations on liability, while encouraging the resolu-
tion of domain name disputes out of court, effectively transfer the
burden upon the domain name holder to prove non-infringement.
This presents a real danger due to the reality that the trademark
holder is likely to have resources that far exceed the owner of the
domain name being challenged. In addition, these provisions en-
courage domain name registries to cancel registrations upon pres-
entation of evidence of any trademark that is identical to,
confusingly similar to, or dilutive of a registered domain name.
Since the act leaves the determination of this complicated legal
question to the registrars themselves and protects them from lia-
106. See S. Rep. No. 106-140, at 17 (1999).
107. See Anticybersquatting Consumer Protection Act § 3004, 113 Stat. 1501,
1501A-549 to -550 (1999); S. Rep. 106-140, at 17.
108. See id. (to be codified at 15 U.S.C. § 1114(D)(iii)) ("A domain name regis-
trar.. shall not be liable for damages under this section for the registration or
maintenance of a domain name for another absent a showing of bad faith intent to
profit from such registration or maintenance of the domain name.").
109. Id.
110. See id.
111. See id.
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bility for incorrect decisions, there is little incentive for a registry
to deny a request to cancel from a trademark holder. 112 The do-
main name registrant may not have registered the trademark, but
may be conducting a legitimate commercial non-infringing use or
could raise a recognized fair use defense that is disapproved of by
the mark owner. 113 Under the new system, the domain name
holder would likely find his domain registration cancelled. This
would effectively shut down his website for years, pending the res-
olution of a lengthy and costly court battle under the civil action
created for his "protection" under the act. This can provide trade-
mark owners with a valuable method of effectively eliminating the
use of their marks for comparative advertising of competing serv-
ices, non-commercial use, or news reporting that the trademark
owner found unfavorable, but that may be protected as fair uses
under current law.1 4
III. THE USE OF TRADITIONAL TRADEMARK LAW TO PREVENT
CYBERSQUATTING
Even without the ACPA, trademark holders have been suc-
cessful in fighting the most abusive cases of cybersquatting. They
have done so by adapting the provisions of the Federal Trademark
112. It is interesting to note that the language of the original bill encouraged
domain name registrars to implement a reasonable policy to prohibit "the registra-
tion of a domain name that is identical to, confusingly similar to, or dilutive of
another's mark registered on the Principal Register of the United States Patent and
Trademark Office." S. 1255, 106th Cong. § 5 (1999) (emphasis added) (the itali-
cized portion is not present in the enacted legislation). The intent behind this limi-
tation was to limit the dispute resolution process to federally registered
trademarks and thus "promote objective criteria and predictability in the dispute
resolution process." S. Rep. No. 106-140, at 17 (1999). Apparently, Congress later
felt that objective criteria and predictability in the dispute resolution process was
not so important, because the final version of the act dropped the federal registra-
tion requirement. Compare S. 1255, § 5, with Anticybersquatting Consumer Pro-
tection Act § 3004, 113 Stat. 1501, 1501A-549 (to be codified at 15 U.S.C.
§ 1114(D)(ii)(II)). Instead, the ACPA merely requires that the disputed domain
name "is identical to, confusingly similar to, or dilutive of another's mark." Anti-
cybersquatting Consumer Protection Act § 3004, 113 Stat. 1501, 1501A-549 (to be
codified at 15 U.S.C. § 1114(D)(ii)(II)).
113. See infra text accompanying notes 210-17.
114. See 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(4) (Supp. III 1997) ("The following shall not be ac-
tionable under this section: (A) Fair use of a famous mark by another person in
comparative commercial advertising or promotion to identify the competing goods
or services of the owner of the famous mark. (B) Noncommercial use of a mark. (C)
All forms of news reporting and news commentary.").
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Dilution Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c) to thwart cybersquatters. The act
provides that "[tihe owner of a famous mark shall be entitled... to
an injunction against another person's commercial use in com-
merce of a mark or trade name, if such use begins after the mark
has become famous and causes dilution of the distinctive quality of
the mark."115 It then enumerates nine non-exclusive factors for
the court to weigh in its determination of whether a mark is "fa-
mous" for purposes of the statute.1 6 Though not defined within
the ACPA, dilution was traditionally defined as "the lessening of
the capacity of a famous mark to identify and distinguish goods or
services, regardless of the presence or absence of-(1) competition
between the owner of the famous mark and other parties, or (2)
likelihood of confusion, mistake, or deception." 117
The famousness requirement of the act has generally been lib-
erally interpreted by the courts in cybersquatting cases, but it and
the likelihood of confusion requirement, "[prevent] the trademark
scheme from granting excessively broad protection at the expense
of legitimate uses."1 8 Panavision Int'l, L.P. v. Toeppen 1 9 is an
example of how the courts have applied the Federal Trademark
Dilution Act to the cybersquatting cases. The defendant, Dennis
Toeppen, registered as domain names trademarks held by Panavi-
sion "as part of a scheme to obtain money."120 Toeppen then de-
manded $13,000 in exchange for releasing the domain names he
had registered and pledge not to acquire any other Internet ad-
dresses for Panavision's trademarks. 121 Panavision filed a trade-
mark dilution action against Toeppen under 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)
and California's state anti-dilution statute. 22 Panavision pre-
vailed and the District Court enjoined Toeppen from using any de-
rivative of the trademarks in question as domain names, or in any
other manner. 123 Toeppen was also ordered to transfer the domain
names in question to Panavision. 124 Although this case illustrates
115. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(1) (Supp. III 1997).
116. See supra note 43.
117. 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (Supp. III 1997).
118. Avery Dennison Corp. v. Sumpton, 189 F.3d 868, 879 (9th Cir. 1999).
119. 141 F.3d 1316 (9th Cir. 1998).
120. Id. at 1318.
121. See id. at 1318-19.
122. See id. at 1319.
123. See Panavision Intl, L.P. v. Toeppen, 945 F. Supp. 1301, 1306 (C.D. Cal.
1996), aff'd, 141 F.3d 1316 (9th Cir. 1998).
124. See id.
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that a victim of cybersquatting could use traditional trademark
law to stop a cybersquatter, the application of traditional trade-
mark law to domain name disputes is limited. 125 The limitations
of traditional trademark law can help to protect a potential market
entrant from the barriers that an overprotective trademark
scheme can create.
The Ninth Circuit case of Avery Dennison Corp. v. Sumpton128
is an example of a court limiting the application of the Federal
Trademark Dilution Act to prevent the over-protection of the
trademark holders rights. Sumpton created an Internet e-mail
service that provided subscribers with vanity e-mail addresses
with custom domain names. 127 His service allowed subscribers to
receive e-mail at addresses primarily in the <.net> and <.org> top
level domains. 128 Sumpton allowed his customers to select their
vanity e-mail addresses from his database, which consisted pri-
marily of common surnames. 129 Included in his database were re-
gistrations for the domain names <avery.net> and
<dennison.net>. 130 Avery Dennison, a supplier of office products
and industrial fasteners, sued Sumpton, alleging trademark dilu-
tion of their registered trademarks "Avery" and "Dennison."131
The District Court, concluding as a matter of law that the trade-
marks in question were famous, granted summary judgment to Av-
ery for its dilution claims, and entered an injunction requiring the
125. See, e.g., Avery Dennison Corp. v. Sumpton, 189 F.3d 868 (9th Cir. 1999)
(granting the defendant summary judgment, overturning a lower court decision
finding that the defendants use of the domain names <avery.net> and <denni-
son.net> diluted Avery-Dennison's trademarks); Cybersell, Inc. v. Cybersell, Inc.,
130 F.3d 414,415 (9th Cir. 1997) (holding that a "normal 'minimum contacts' anal-
ysis" is necessary for jurisdiction even in cases involving cyberspace); HQM, Ltd. v.
Hatfield, 71 F. Supp.2d 500 (S.D. Md. 1999) (dismissing a suit by Hatfield, Inc.
under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) against William Hatfield for registering
<hatfield.com>); Hasbro, Inc. v. Clue Computing, Inc., 66 F. Supp.2d 117 (D. Mass.
1999) (granting defendants motion for summary judgment even though the offend-
ing domain name, <clue.com>, was nearly identical to the trademark in dispute);
Porsche Cars N. Am., Inc. v. Porsch.com, 51 F. Supp.2d 707 (E.D. Va. 1999) (dis-
missing an in rem action against the offending domain name for lack of personal
jurisdiction).
126. Avery Dennison Corp. v. Sumpton, 189 F.3d 868 (9th Cir. 1999).
127. See id. at 872.
128. See id.
129. See id.
130. See id.
131. See id. at 872-73.
MASTERS OF THEIR DOMAINS
transfer of the registrations to Avery Dennison.' 3 2 The Ninth Cir-
cuit reversed, instead granting summary judgment to Sumpton.133
The court held that two of the elements required by the statute13 '
had not been met. First, the trademarks "Avery" and "Dennison"
were not famous as defined by the dilution act.135 One of the fac-
tors that influenced the court's decision on famousness was the fact
that over 800 businesses operated with the name "Avery" and over
200 business used the name "Dennison."136 Second, the court held
that Sumpton's registration of the domain names in dispute did
not constitute a commercial use.' 3 7
In an action under the provisions of the ACPA, the Avery Den-
nison case would likely have a different result. First, under a dis-
pute resolution policy like those suggested by the language of the
ACPA, 138 a domain name registrar would have cancelled
Sumpton's domain name registrations because they were identical
or confusingly similar to another's mark. 139 Second, the court dis-
missed the Avery Dennison case partly based upon a finding that
Sumpton's registration of the domain names was not a commercial
use. 140 While this is a required element of 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c), the
ACPA does not require a commercial use.141 Third, Avery Denni-
son would have a strong case for damages in a civil action under
the new 15 U.S.C. § 1125(d). Sumpton registered a domain name
that was identical to a trademark that was distinctive at the time
of the registration of the domain name. 142 In addition, many of the
bad faith factors enumerated by the act weigh heavily against
132. See Avery, 189 F.3d at 873.
133. See id. at 881-82.
134. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c) (Supp. I1 1997).
135. See Avery, 189 F.3d at 879.
136. See id. at 878.
137. See id. at 879-80.
138. See supra text accompanying notes 103-11.
139. Anticybersquatting Consumer Protection Act of 1999, Pub. L. No. 106-113,
113 Stat. 1501 (1999).
140. See Avery, 189 F.3d at 879-80.
141. Compare 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c) (Supp. III 1997), with Anticybersquatting
Consumer Protection Act § 3002, 113 Stat. 1501, 1501A-545 to -546 (to be codified
at 15 U.S.C. § 1125(d)(1)(A)).
142. See Avery, 189 F.3d at 876-77. In dictum the court noted that "Applying
the famousness factors from the Federal Trademark Dilution Act to the facts of the
case at bench, we conclude that Avery Dennison likely establishes acquired dis-
tinctiveness in the 'Avery' and 'Dennison' trademarks." Id.
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Sumpton. 143 He had no trademark or intellectual property rights
in the domain names. Sumpton also attempted to assign the use of
the mark to a third party for consideration (although not substan-
tial consideration).14 4 It is arguable whether his attempt to do so
would be considered "in the bona fide offering of any goods or serv-
ices."145 The names were not the legal name or a name commonly
used to identify him or his organization. 146 Also, in the process of
acquiring his database of domain names, he acquired multiple do-
main names which were identical or similar to trademarks and
had a history of doing so. 147 Finally, he could raise only one of the
defensive factors. He could raise the defense that he was using the
domain name in connection with the bona fide offering of goods or
services. However, this would be a very arguable issue. Apart from
the enumerated factors, it would also be possible for Sumpton to
raise the ACPA's fair use defense. 148 To be successful with this
defense he would have to show that he was relying on a reasonable
belief that his use was lawful. 149 In any event, Sumpton's poten-
tial liability under the ACPA would be up to $100,000 per domain
name registration regardless of Avery Dennison's actual dam-
ages. 150 This case illustrates the leverage that a trademark owner
can use to its advantage when protecting its trademarks. When
faced with such potential liability, few small domain name regis-
trants would be willing to defend their registrations, even when
the trademark claim was dubious at best.
Although the Ninth Circuit refused to find for Avery Dennison
in the case because Sumpton had "use[d] words that happen to be
trademarks for their non-trademark value,"' 51 the ACPA makes no
such provision. The Avery Dennison court held that Sumpton's use
143. See Anticybersquatting Consumer Protection Act § 3002, 113 Stat. 1501,
1501A-546.
144. See Avery, 189 F.3d at 872 (Sumpton's business of "selling" domain names
to users for a $19.95 fee could be considered an assignment to a third party for
consideration).
145. Anticybersquatting Consumer Protection Act § 3002, 113 Stat. 1501,
1501A-546.
146. See Avery, 189 F.3d at 872-73.
147. See id.
148. See Anticybersquatting Consumer Protection Act § 3002, 113 Stat. 1501,
1501A-546 (to be codified at 15 U.S.C. 1125(d)(1)(B)(ii)).
149. See id.
150. See id. § 3003, 113 Stat. 1501, 1501A-549 (to be codified at 15 U.S.C.
1117(d)).
151. Avery, 189 F.3d at 880.
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was not the use of "trademarks qua trademarks as required by the
caselaw to establish commercial use."15 2 Therefore, the court
found that no dilution had occurred. 15 3 In contrast, since the
ACPA does not require the trademark use to be commercial, a use
like Sumpton's would not be exempted from its provisions. This
has the effect of granting trademark owners the ability to prevent
domain name registrations like Sumpton's. Such a case may not
be an infringement in the real world, but it could be considered an
infringement in the special context of the Internet.
IV. THE ACPA's SIDE EFFECTS
A. The Abandonment of the Likelihood of Confusion and Use in
Commerce Requirements for Domain Name Infringement
Cases
Trademark law and domain name concepts conflict in a
number of ways. These conflicts make the application of trade-
mark law to cybersquatting cases difficult. The ability of an indi-
vidual with no more resources than the ability to pay a $35
registration fee, 154 to have so much control over a much larger cor-
porate entity depends upon the exclusive nature of the domain
name registration system. Only one person can use any one do-
main name.' 5 5 Due to this exclusivity, a conflict occurs when
traditional trademark law is applied to the domain name registra-
tion system. Both the domain name registries and the Patent and
Trademark Office maintain databases containing words and the
persons or entities to which they are registered. 156 The important
difference is that while domain names are exclusive,' 57 trade-
152. Id. (emphasis added).
153. See id.
154. See Network Solutions, Inc., Web Address (With Technical Information)
Pricing (visited Jan. 25, 2000) http://www.networksolutions.com/catalog/domain-
name/pricing/ index.html> (Network Solutions registration fee is $35 per year with
a one year minimum).
155. See Network Solutions, Inc., Frequently Asked Questions (visited Dec 22,
1999) <http://www.networksolutions.com/help/general.html> ("[N]o two parties
can ever hold the same Web Address simultaneously.").
156. See 15 U.S.C. § 1057(a) (1994) ("Certificates of registration of marks regis-
tered upon the principal register shall be issued.., and a record thereof shall be
kept in the Patent and Trademark Office.").
157. See Network Solutions, Inc., Frequently Asked Questions (visited Dec. 22,
1999) <http://www.networksolutions.com/help/general.html>.
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marks are not necessarily exclusive.' 58 "ITihe ultimate test [in in-
fringement analysis] is whether the public is likely to be deceived
or confused by the similarity of the marks," 59 not whether or not
the marks are identical. "Infringement does not exist, though the
marks be identical and the goods very similar, when the evidence
indicates no [likelihood of confusion]." 60 Therefore, two entities
can use textually identical marks without infringing upon each
other, if there is no likelihood that the public would confuse
them. 16 1 This can occur when two companies use textually identi-
cal marks in different geographical areas or to identify products or
services in distinctly different industries.' 62
A classic example is found in Wiener King, Inc. v. Wiener King
Corp.16 3 The Wiener King court found that two businesses could
operate with the same name, selling the same product, without in-
fringement due to the geographical distance between the two res-
taurants. 16 4 This peaceful coexistence, accepted by current
trademark law, would end if one of the restaurants decided to ad-
vertise its wieners on the Internet. 165 It is the inherent exclusivity
of the Internet domain name and its global reach, that makes the
use of trademark law a poor choice to combat domain name abuses.
This conflict has been noted by the United States District Court for
the Central District of California.
158. See Brookfield Comm., Inc. v. West Coast Entertainment Corp., 174 F.3d
1036, 1054 (9th Cir. 1999).
159. Academy of Motion Picture Arts and Sciences v. Creative House Promo-
tions, Inc., 944 F.2d 1446, 1454 (9th Cir. 1991).
160. James Burrough Ltd. v. Sign of the Beefeater, Inc., 540 F.2d 266, 274 (7th
Cir. 1976).
161. See id.
162. See Brookfield, 174 F.3d at 1054. See, e.g., Natural Footwear Ltd. v. Hart,
Schaffner & Marx, 760 F.2d 1383, 1406-07 (3d Cir. 1985) (allowing two companies
to use the trademark "ROOTS" on footwear, with geographic restrictions, where a
senior user with only regional sales existed prior to the national registration of the
mark); Exquisite Form Ind., Inc., v. Exquisite Fabrics of London, 378 F. Supp. 403,
412-13 (S.D.N.Y. 1974) (finding the trademarked word "Exquisite" used by the
plaintiff to identify its brand of women's undergarments was not infringed upon by
defendants use of the same word to identify their 60ft rolls of knitted fabrics since
there was no likelihood of confusion).
163. 615 F.2d 512 (C.C.P.A. 1980).
164. See id. at 523-24.
165. It would be impossible for both companies to register <wienerking.com> as
a domain name. See Network Solutions, Inc., Frequently Asked Questions (visited
Dec 22, 1999) <http://www. networksolutions.com/help/general.html>.
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[Trademark law permits multiple parties to use the same
mark for different classes of goods and services; however, the
current organization of the Internet permits only one use of a
domain name, regardless of the goods or services offered.
That is, although two or more businesses can own the trade-
mark 'Acme,' only one business can operate on the Internet
with the domain name 'acme.com.' Such a limitation conflicts
with trademark principles and hinders the use of the Internet
by businesses. 166
The conflict can be clearly seen in the facts of a recent cybersquat-
ting case. In Cello Holdings, L.L.C. v. Lawrence Dahl Compa-
nies,167 the defendant registered the domain name <cello.com> and
then offered to sell it to the plaintiff and others for $4,800.168 Con-
sequently Cello Holdings filed suit, originally under the FTDA and
later, in an amended complaint, under the ACPA.1 69 The court
noted that in this case, Cello Holdings was not alone in their use of
the trademark "cello".170 Companies have used the word "cello"
alone and with other words for a wide variety products and serv-
ices ranging from floor wax to shampoo. 17 1 Cello Holdings objected
only when the domain name <cello.com> was registered. While
these concurrent uses of the same word as a trademark were toler-
ated by traditional trademark law, the use of the same word as a
domain name triggered a lawsuit. 172 The difference is that a com-
peting company's use of the word "cello" on a product did not pre-
vent Cello Holdings from using the same word on its products. 173
However, the same company registering it as a domain name
would make it impossible for Cello Holdings to ever register
<cello.com> themselves. 174 The eventual outcome of this case is
166. Panavision Int'l, L.P.v. Toeppen, 945 F. Supp. 1296, 1302 (C.D. Ca. 1996).
167. Cello Holdings, L.L.C. v. Lawrence Dahl Co., No. 97 Civ. 7677(DC), 2000
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3936 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 29, 2000).
168. See id. at *4, 8.
169. See id. at *8-9.
170. See id. at *4-7.
171. See id. The court lists sixteen different registered trademarks for products
and services, and notes that at least ten companies, other than the plaintiff, use
"cello" as part of their business name. See id.
172. See Cello, 2000 U.S. LEXIS 3926 at *1.
173. See id. at *4-7.
174. See Network Solutions, Inc., Frequently Asked Questions (visited Dec 22,
1999) <http://www.networksolutions.com/help/general.html>.
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yet to be seen. 175 Instead of attempting to reconcile the conflict
between the exclusivity of domain names and the trademark prin-
ciple that two textually identical trademarks can co-exist, the
ACPA modifies the traditional trademark principles.
One example of this is the elimination of the traditional re-
quirement that the infringing party use the mark in commerce. 176
Both the Lanham Act and the FTDA require that the infringing
party use the mark in commerce.' 77 The ACPA does not require
any use in commerce.'17 Merely registering, trafficking, or using a
domain name in bad faith is sufficient to violate its provisions. 179
Another example is that the ACPA subtly changes the likelihood of
confusion requirement, a deeply rooted aspect of trademark law. ' 80
The ACPA changes the likelihood of confusion principle by al-
lowing the owner of a trademark or service mark to sue bad faith
registrations "without regard to the goods or services of the par-
ties."18 Although the factors used to determine "bad faith" take
into consideration "the extent to which the domain name consists
of the legal name of the person [and] the person's prior use, if any,
of the domain name in connection with the bona fide offering of any
175. At the time of the publication of this comment this case has not yet been
decided. See Cello, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3936, at *1-2.
176. See 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a)(1) (1994) ("Any person who, on or in connection
with any goods or services, or any container for goods, uses in commerce any word,
term, name, symbol or device... shall be liable in a civil action by any person...
damaged by such act.") (emphasis added). See also 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(1) (Supp.
III 1997) (Allowing action only "against another person's commercial use in com-
merce of a mark or trade name.") (emphasis added).
177. See 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a)(1), (c)(1) (Supp. III 1997); Intermatic, Inc. v. Toep-
pen, 947 F. Supp. 1227, 1238 (N.D. Ill. 1996) ("In order to state a cause of action
under the [Federal Trademark Dilution Act] a party must show that the mark is
famous and that the complainant's use is commercial and in commerce which is
likely to cause dilution."); Juno Online Serv., v. Juno Lighting, Inc., 979 F. Supp
684, 691 (N.D. Ill. 1997) ("To claim successfully a violation of Section 43(a) [trade-
mark infringement], plaintiff must allege that defendant used the trademark in
commerce.").
178. See Anticybersquatting Consumer Protection Act of 1999, Pub. L. No. 106-
113, §§ 3001-06, 3008, 113 Stat 1501, 1501A-545 to -551 (1999).
179. See id. § 3002, 113 Stat. 1501, 1501A-545-46 (to be codified at 15 U.S.C.
§ 1125 (d)(1)(A)).
180. See generally Restatement (Third) of Unfair Competition § 20 (1995) (de-
fining the standard of infringement and the likelihood of confusion).
181. Anticybersquatting Consumer Protection Act § 3002, 113 Stat. 1501,
1501A-545 to -546 (to be codified at 15 U.S.C. § 1125 (d)(1)(A)).
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goods or services" 18 2 the removal of the consideration of the "goods
or services of the parties" from the equation is a notable one. In an
infringement action under 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a) the plaintiff must
show that the infringing party used the mark in commerce, in con-
nection with goods or services, in a way which
is likely to cause confusion or to cause mistake, or to
deceive... as to the origin, sponsorship, or approval of his or
her goods services or commercial activities by another person,
or . . .in commercial advertising ... misrepresents the na-
ture . . .of his or her or another persons goods services or
commercial activities. 8 3
The corresponding restriction for non-famous marks in the ACPA
requires only that the mark be distinctive at the time of the regis-
tration of the domain name and that "the domain name, is identi-
cal or confusingly similar to such mark."18 4
While the language of both statutes requires a likelihood of
confusion, they differ as to what type of confusion is actionable.
The confusion test, under 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a), conforms to the
traditional rationale and purpose of trademark law which:
by preventing others from copying a source identifying mark,
'reduce[s] the customer's costs of shopping and making
purchasing decisions,' for it quickly and easily assures a po-
tential customer that this item-the item with this mark-is
made by the same producer as other similarly marked items
that he or she liked (or disliked in the past). At the same
time, the law helps assure a producer that it (and not an imi-
tating competitor) will reap the financial, reputation-related
rewards associated with a desirable product. The law
thereby 'encourage [s] the production of quality products,' and
simultaneously discourages those who hope to sell inferior
products by capitalizing on a consumer's inability quickly to
evaluate the quality of an item offered for sale.1 8 5
182. Id. § 3002, 113 Stat. at 1501A-546 (to be codified at 15 U.S.C.
§ 1125(d)(1)(B)(ii-iii)).
183. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a)(1) (1994).
184. Anticybersquatting Consumer Protection Act § 3002, 113 Stat. 1501,
1501A-546 (to be codified at 15 U.S.C. § 1125 (d)(1)(A)(ii)(I)) (emphasis added).
185. Qualitex Co. v. Jacobson Products Co., 514 U.S. 159, 163-64 (1995) (quot-
ing 1 J. McCarthy, McCarthy on Trademarks and Unfair Competition § 2.01121, at
2-3 (3d ed. 1994)) (citations omitted) (emphasis in original).
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It is the protection of the consumer that is the primary concern of
the court.' 8 6 The fact that the manufacturer reaps a benefit is sec-
ondary and justified by the fact that ultimately the consumer bene-
fits from quality products.'8 7
In contrast, the ACPA focuses on the likelihood that a domain
name is confusingly similar to a mark without regard for the good
or services of the parties.'88 The traditional infringement test is
the "likelihood of confusion, i.e., whether the similarity of the
marks is likely to confuse customers about the source of the prod-
ucts."'8 9 By focusing on the likelihood of confusion as to the source
of the products, the court recognizes that it is the consumer who
the act protects, not just the trademark holder.' 90 Here the ACPA
departs from the traditional confusion analysis. It is concerned not
with the possibility that a consumer is unclear as to the origin of a
product, but instead with the possibility of confusion between a
registered domain name and a mark.19' Although Congress is
careful to justify the act by highlighting the effect cybersquatting
has on consumers, 192 by focusing solely on the possibility of confu-
sion between the textual content of a trademark and a domain
name, it has greatly increased the scope of trademark protection.
The Act could allow a mark holder to prevent the use of its mark in
cyberspace in cases that are not actionable in the real world. Ac-
tions that would have been dismissed under an action for infringe-
ment or dilution because of a lack of jurisdiction, use in commerce,
or likelihood of confusion would not automatically fail under the
186. See id.
187. See id.
188. See Anticybersquatting Consumer Protection Act § 3002, 113 Stat. 1501,
1501A-545,
189. E. & J. Gallo Winery v. Gallo Cattle Co., 967 F.2d 1280, 1290 (9th Cir.
1992) (emphasis added).
190. See id.
191. See Anticybersquatting Consumer Protection Act § 3001, 113 Stat. 1501,
1501A-545-46 (to be codified at 15 U.S.C. § 1125(d)(1)(A)).
192. See S. 1255, 106th Cong. § 2(1)(A) (1999) ("[Cybersquatting] results in con-
sumer fraud and public confusion as to the true source or sponsorship of goods and
services."); S. Rep. No. 106-140, at 5 (1999) ("The practice of cybersquatting harms
consumers, electronic commerce, and the goodwill equity of valuable U.S. brand
names, upon which consumers increasingly rely to locate the true source of genu-
ine goods and services on the Internet.").
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ACPA.193 Thus, these cases could survive to reach an ACPA bad
faith analysis by a court.
The ACPA does not entirely ignore the use in commerce re-
quirement. Instead, the ACPA places it among the list of factors
the court uses to determine bad faith under the Act.' 94 However,
these enumerated bad faith factors are only guidelines for the trial
judge; no one factor can automatically show or exclude a finding of
bad faith.195 This has the effect of changing one of the required
elements of a trademark infringement action to a mere factor that
can be considered or ignored at the discretion of a trial judge.196
Consequently, the ACPA removes an important limitation of tradi-
tional trademark law.
This limitation helped to prevent trademark holders from
gaining so much protection from trademark law that a new entrant
to a market would find it impossible to compete without infringing
a trademark. 197 Since the ACPA has removed many of these
checks, trademark owners now have greater ability to prevent
competition on the Internet than they have in the real world mar-
ketplace. In cybersquatting cases before the enactment of the
193. See Anticybersquatting Consumer Protection Act § 3002, 113 Stat 1501,
1501A-545 to -546 (to be codified at 15 U.S.C. § 1125(d)(1)(A)). See, e.g., Avery
Dennison Corp. v. Sumpton, 189 F.3d 868 (9th Cir. 1999) (granting the defendant
summary judgment, overturning a lower court decision finding that the defendants
use of the domain names <avery.net> and <dennison.net> diluted Avery-Denni-
son's trademarks); Cybersell, Inc. v. Cybersell, Inc., 130 F.3d 414 (9th Cir. 1997)
(holding that a "normal 'minimum contacts' analysis" is necessary for jurisdiction
even in cases involving cyberspace); HQM, Ltd. v. Hatfield, 71 F. Supp.2d 500 (S.D.
Md. 1999) (dismissing a suit by Hatfield, Inc. under F.R.C.P. 12(b)(6) against Wil-
liam Hatfield for registering <hatfield.com>); Hasbro, Inc. v. Clue Computing, Inc.,
66 F. Supp.2d 117 (D. Mass. 1999) (granting defendants motion for summary judg-
ment even though the offending domain name, <clue.com>, was nearly identical to
the trademark in dispute); Porsche Cars N. Am., Inc. v. Porsch.com, 51 F. Supp.2d
707 (E.D. Va. 1999) (dismissing an in rem action against the offending domain
name for lack of personal jurisdiction).
194. See Anticybersquatting Consumer Protection Act § 3002, 113 Stat. 1501,
1501A-546 (to be codified at 15 U.S.C. § 1125(d)(1)(A)(ii)(I)-(IX)).
195. See id. § 3002, 113 Stat. 1501, 1501A-546 (to be codified at 15 U.S.C.
§ 1125 (d)(1)(B)) ("In determining whether a person has a bad faith intent ... a
court may consider factors such as, but not limited to [the enumerated factors].")
(emphasis added).
196. See id.
197. When trademark protection is too broad "[eintry barriers [can] be created,
discouraging entry and competition, particularly from small firms. This result is
expressly at odds with the purposes of the trademark laws." Thompson Med. Co.,
Inc. v. Pfizer, Inc., 753 F.2d 208, 217 (2d Cir. 1985).
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ACPA, the courts had trouble overcoming these limitations and
grappled with these issues in order to provide trademark owners
with legal relief from cybersquatters. 198
The use in commerce requirement in particular has been the
subject of scrutiny by the courts. This can be seen in the
Panavison case. 199 Toeppen appealed the district court's determi-
nation that he had made commercial use of the mark that had
caused a dilution in the quality of the mark.2°° The Ninth Circuit
carefully examined the commercial use requirement noting that
although registering a domain name alone is not a "commercial
use",20 ' his attempt to sell the trademarks themselves constituted
a commercial use under both the Federal and California Trade-
mark Dilution Acts. 20 2 Although the courts are often quick to find
additional grounds for finding a commercial use, the notion that
more than a mere domain name registration is required to consti-
tute a commercial use is widely accepted by the courts. 20 3 This is
an important distinction because in a Federal dilution claim, the
plaintiff must show a commercial use beyond the mere registration
of a domain name.20 4 The ACPA abandons the requirement of "use
in commerce" in its required elements.20 5 The removal of this re-
quirement continues a trend noted by the court in Panavision.
That court, quoting from both Boston Pro Hockey Assoc. Inc v. Dal-
las Cap & Emblem Mfg.206 and the trial court's opinion, noted that
198. See, e.g., Panavision Int'l, L.P. v. Toeppen, 141 F.3d 1316 (9th Cir. 1998).
199. See id.
200. See id. at 1324.
201. Id.
202. See id. at 1326-27.
203. See Avery Dennison Corp. v. Sumpton, 189 F.3d 868, 879-80 (9th Cir.
1999); Panavision Int'l, L.P. v. Toeppen, 141 F.3d 1316, 1324-25 (9th Cir. 1997);
Academy of Motion Picture Arts and Sciences v. Network Solutions, Inc., 989 F.
Supp. 1276, 1278-79 (9th Cir. 1997); Lockheed Martin Corp., v. Network Solutions,
Inc., 985 F. Supp. 949, 959-60 (C.D. Ca. 1997).
204. See, e.g., Academy, 989 F. Supp. at 1278-79 (denying a request for a pre-
liminary injunction because the defendant's, a domain name registration agency,
mere registration of the name was not a "use in commerce"); Lockheed, 985 F.
Supp. at 959-60, 968 (granting summary judgment for the defendant, a domain
name registration agency, finding that their sole act of registering the domain
name alone was not a use in commerce under the Federal Trademark Dilution
Act).
205. See Anticybersquatting Consumer Protection Act of 1999, Pub. L. No. 106-
113, § 3002, 113 Stat. 1501, 1501A-545 to -546 (1999) (to be codified at 15 U.S.C.
§ 1125(d)(1)(A)).
206. 510 F.2d 1004 (5th Cir. 1975).
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[tihe court [in Boston Pro Hockey] concluded that trademark
law should protect the trademark itself. Although our deci-
sion here may slightly tilt the trademark laws from the pur-
pose of protecting the public to the protection of the business
interests of plaintiffs, we think that the two become ... in-
termeshed... Whereas traditional trademark law sought pri-
marily to protect consumers, dilution laws place more
emphasis on protecting the investment of the trademark
owners.
207
The ACPA would increase this tilt, granting trademark own-
ers strong measures with which to challenge uses of their marks as
domain names that have no counterpart in traditional trademark
law. Although it may be titled the Anticybersquatting Consumer
Protection Act, it does very little to actually protect consumers. In-
stead, it protects trademark owners by effectively granting them
the exclusive right to use their mark as a domain name and to con-
trol the ability of others to register domain names similar to their
marks. Since the trademark holders generally have far superior
resources and domain name registrars are strongly encouraged to
side with the trademark owners, the act gives powerful new weap-
ons to companies that wish to engage in the practice of reverse
cybersquatting.
B. Reverse Cybersquatting
The practice of reverse cybersquatting, also called revere do-
main name hijacking, turns the traditional notions of cybersquat-
ting on its head. In traditional cybersquatting, an individual or
small organization attempts to register a larger entity's trademark
in an attempt to extort money. Here a smaller entity is able to
exploit a weakness in the system in order to gain the attention of a
larger entity. In reverse cybersquatting, a larger organization
uses its trademark rights to prevent a smaller entity from using its
mark or a derivation thereof either because the company covets the
domain name, or because the registrant is using it for a purpose
which the company disapproves.208 Large companies whose prod-
ucts or names contain common words or initials often attempt to
207. Panavision Intl, L.P. v. Toeppen, 141 F.3d 1316, 1325-26 n.5 (9th Cir.
1998) (citations omitted).
208. See generally Carl Oppedahl, Recent Trademark Cases Examine Reverse
Domain Name Hijacking, 21 Hastings Comm. L. J. 535, 543-44 (1999) (discussing
cases of reverse-cybersquatting).
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use trademark protections to cancel the registration of domain
names they desire.209
A company can also use this tactic to silence consumer criti-
cism or forms of competition on the Internet. For example, a dis-
gruntled consumer may register a domain name that contains a
trademark in order to set up a web site critical of the company's
product. Under the FTDA such a non-commercial commentary or
news use would be entitled to a fair-use defense under 15 U.S.C.
§ 1125(c)(4)(A)-(C). 210 The ACPA also provides for a fair use de-
fense to a civil action in cybersquatting, but it is effective only
against a civil action.211 It would not apply to a complaint under a
domain name registrar's dispute resolution policy. 212
The ACPA provides in its savings clause that "[Niothing in
this Act shall affect any defense available to a defendant under the
Trademark Act of 1946 (including any defense under section
43(c)(4) of such Act or relating to fair use)."213 It also specifically
provides that "[bad faith intent... shall not be found in any case
in which the court determines that the person believed and had
reasonable grounds to believe that the use of the domain name was
a fair use or otherwise lawful."214 This provision furnishes the de-
fendant in a cybersquatting suit with a powerful defense while still
protecting trademark holders from true cybersquatting. Further-
more, it allows an individual who has been sued for cybersquatting
to show that he had a reasonable belief that his use was either a
209. See, e.g., Data Concepts, Inc. v. Digital Consulting, Inc., 150 F.3d 620 (6th
Cir. 1998) (litigation over <dci.com>); Cello Holdings, L.L.C. v. Lawrence Dahl Co.,
No. 97 Civ. 7677(DC), 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3936, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 29, 2000)
(litigation over the domain name <cello.com>); CD Solutions, Inc. v. Tooker, 15 F.
Supp.2d 986 (D. Ore. 1998) (litigation over <cds.com>).
210. See 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(4)(A)-(C) (Supp. III 1997) The Following shall not
be actionable under this section:
(A) Fair use of a famous mark by another person in comparative com-
mercial advertising or promotion to identify the competing goods or serv-
ices of the owner of the famous mark.
(B) Noncommercial use of the mark.
(C) All forms of news reporting and news commentary.
Id.
211. See Anticybersquatting Consumer Protection Act of 1999, Pub. L. No. 106-
113, § 3002, 113 Stat 1501, 1501A-546 (1999) (to be codified at 15 U.S.C.
§ 1125(d)(1)(B)(ii)).
212. See id.
213. Id. § 3008, 113 Stat. 1501, 1501A-551 (1999).
214. Id. §3002, 113 Stat. at 1501A-546 (to be codified at 15 U.S.C.
§ 1125(d)(1)(B)(ii)).
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protected fair use or that he believed his use was lawful.215 Such a
showing would provide for an absolute defense against a cyber-
squatting action even if the fair use or other uses were later shown
to have no legal basis. Under the ACPA's fair use defense, upon a
showing of the defendants reasonable belief that his registration
was a fair or lawful use a judge cannot find bad faith.216 Since a
showing of bad faith is a required element of the cybersquatting
cause of action, absent a finding of bad faith, no violation of the
ACPA's cybersquatting provisions can be found.217 Although Con-
gress intended the bad faith requirement to provide a necessary
check upon the new rights granted to trademark owners by the
ACPA, other provisions of the act limit its true effectiveness. 2 18
Through provisions of the ACPA, Congress encouraged domain
name registration agencies to institute their own dispute resolu-
tion policy by granting these agencies immunity from liability for
wrongful cancellations of domain names in accordance with this
policy.219 Such policies provide trademark holders with a non-judi-
cial process through which they can force the cancellation of of-
fending domain names. Cybersquatting cases handled within the
dispute resolution policy of a domain name registrar are not sub-
ject to the same bad faith analysis put forth under the new 15
U.S.C. § 1125(d).220 Instead, the act encourages domain name re-
gistries to create a policy canceling a domain name registration
based only on a showing that the domain name is identical to or
confusingly similar to a trademark. 22 ' Such a policy could effec-
tively eliminate the value of any fair use protection for a small en-
tity with limited resources. The Internet Corporation for Assigned
Names and Numbers (ICANN) has implemented a uniform domain
215. See id.
216. See id.
217. See id. § 3002, 113 Stat. at 1501A-545 to -546 (to be codified at 15 U.S.C.
§ 1125(d)(1)(A)(i)).
218. See H.R. Rep. No. 106-412, at 10 (1999) ("[The bad faith factors] are
designed to balance the property interests of trademark owners with the legiti-
mate interests of Internet users and others who seek to make lawful uses of other's
marks, including for purposes such as comparative advertising, comment, criti-
cism, parody, news reporting, fair-use, etc."); Accord S. Rep. No. 106-140, at 13
(1999).
219. See Anticybersquatting Consumer Protection Act of 1999, Pub. L. No. 106-
113, § 3005, 113 Stat. 1501, 1501A-549 to -50 (1999).
220. See id. § 3004, 113 Stat. at 1501A-549 (to be codified at 15 U.S.C.
§ 1114(D)(ii)(I)).
221. See id.
20001
596 ROGER WILLIAMS UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 5:563
name dispute resolution policy that will apply to customers of all
domain name registries beginning on January 3, 2000.222
Under this policy, ICANN requires that a domain name regis-
trant submit to a "mandatory administrative proceeding" when a
third party alleges that the domain name infringes on a trade-
mark, the domain name registrant has no rights in the domain
name, and the domain name is being used in bad faith.223 The
administrative hearing panel makes its decision "on the basis of
the statements and documents submitted and in accordance with
the [Uniform Domain Name Dispute Resolution Policy], these
Rules and any Rules and principles of law that it deems applica-
ble."224 The panel considers four non-exclusive factors, which in-
clude: evidence that the registrant acquired the domain name in
order to sell it for a profit, to prevent the owner from using it, to
disrupt the business of a competitor, or to attract users to the site
by confusing them as to the origin or sponsorship of your site.225 If
the panel finds against the original domain name registrant, he
can avoid losing the registration by commencing a lawsuit in the
jurisdiction of the domain name registrar against the trademark
holder within ten business days. 226
222. See Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers, Implementa-
tion Schedule for Uniform Domain Name Resolution Policy (last modified Nov. 29,
1999) <http://www.icann.org/udrp/udrp-schedule.htm>.
223. See Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers, Uniform Do-
main Name Dispute Resolution Policy (last modified Dec. 5, 1999) <http://
www.icann.org/udrp/udrp-policy-24oct99.htm>
You are required to submit to a mandatory administrative proceeding
in the event that a third party (a "complainant") asserts to the applicable
Provider, in compliance with the Rules of Procedure, that
(i) your domain name is identical or confusingly similar to a trade-
mark or service mark in which the complainant has rights; and
(ii) you have no rights or legitimate interests in respect of the domain
name; and
(iii) your domain name has been registered and is being used in bad
faith.
Id.
224. See Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers, Rules for
Uniform Domain Name Dispute Resolution Policy (visited Dec. 15, 1999) <http://
www.icann.org/udrp/udrp-rules-24oct1999.htm>.
225. See id.
226. See id.
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The ACPA specifically provides for such a suit.227 However,
this provision of the ACPA places the burden of showing a lack of
infringement on the allegedly infringing party.228 The ACPA al-
lows the "domain name registrant whose domain name has been
suspended.., under a [dispute resolution] policy described under
[the new 15 U.S.C. § 1114(D)(ii)(II)] may ... file a civil action to
establish that the registration or use of the domain name ... is not
unlawful under this Act."229 This is contrary to the provisions of
infringement under the Lanham Act 230 and the Federal Trade-
mark Dilution Act,231 both of which require the trademark owner
to prove infringement. Moreover, it places a serious financial bur-
den upon the registrant. Most persons or groups using a trade-
mark as a domain name in a manner covered by a fair use defense
are likely to have limited financial resources. In addition, as was
noted by one commentator, the ten-day period provided by the
ICANN policy, effectively requires that the registrant hire a law-
yer, at further expense, to represent him before the panel. 23 2 This
is due to the reality that the ten-day "grace" period would not pro-
vide a losing registrant enough time to secure an attorney and
have him file a complaint in a court within the registrar's jurisdic-
tion.233 It is likely that a suit to reacquire the name under the
ACPA's Limitation on Liability Provisions234 or even a reasonable
defense before a dispute resolution panel, would be unavailable to
the small registrant due to the expense involved. Consequently,
there will be little disincentive to prevent trademark owners from
227. See Anticybersquatting Consumer Protection Act of 1999, Pub. L. No. 106-
113, § 3004, 113 Stat. 1501, 1501A-550 (1999) (to be codified at 15 U.S.C.
§ 1114(D)(v)).
228. See id.
229. Id.
230. See 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a) ("Any person who [violates 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a)]
shall be liable in a civil action by any person who believes that he or she is likely to
be damaged by such act.").
231. See 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c) (Supp. III 1997). ("The owner of a famous mark
shall be entitled . . .to an injunction against another person's commercial use in
commerce of a mark or trade name.").
232. See A. Michael Froomkin, A Catalog of Critical Process Failures; Progress
on Substance; More Work Needed (visited Dec. 15, 1999) <http://www.icann.org/
comments-mail/comment-drp/current/msgOO10l.html> (submitted as a Public
Comment to the then proposed Uniform Dispute Resolution Policy).
233. See id.
234. See Anticybersquatting Consumer Protection Act of 1999, Pub. L. No. 106-
113, § 3004, 113 Stat. 1501, 1501A-550 (1999) (to be codified at 15 U.S.C.
§ 1114(D)(v)).
20001 597
598 ROGER WILLIAMS UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW (Vol. 5:563
requesting the cancellation of any domain name that could be simi-
lar to one of their trademarks. The ACPA strengthens this ability
due to the manner in which it blurs the distinction between a word
and the intangible trademark itself, which may be represented by
a word.
C. The Ownership of Words
A domain name can be easily cancelled, transferred or other-
wise assigned to another by simply contacting the domain name
registry.236 This is equally true of a domain name that is textually
identical to a trademark.236 Although the domain name itself is
freely assignable, the same cannot be said for the underlying
trademark itself. The assignment of a trademark without its ac-
companying goodwill can result in the abandonment of the
mark.23 7 This fact highlights an important distinction that is lost
within the ACPA. Even when a trademark owner registers a do-
main name that is textually identical to his trademark, they re-
main separable. 238 It would be entirely possible for the trademark
holder to transfer the domain name to another company without
transferring the trademark. 239 The Lanham Act was designed to
"[make] actionable the deceptive and misleading use of trade-
marks ... and to protect persons engaged in such commerce...
against unfair competition."240 The ACPA blurs the distinction be-
tween the right to restrict the use of a trademark granted under
traditional trademark law and the right to control the use of a
mark's textual equivalent.
Few sections of the ACPA clearly acknowledge the fact that
the domain names being protected and referenced throughout the
235. See Network Solutions, Inc., FAQs about the Registrant Name Change
Agreement (visited Mar. 22, 2000) <http://www.networksolutions.com/help/
rncfaq.html>.
236. See id.
237. See 15 U.S.C. § 1060 (1994). ("A registered mark ... shall be assignable
with the goodwill of the business in which the mark is used, or with that part of
the business connected with the use of and symbolized by the mark."); Restate-
ment (Third) of Unfair Competition § 20 (1995) ("An assignment of ownership that
does not maintain continuity in the use of the designation can result in the aban-
donment of the designation.").
238. See 15 U.S.C. § 1060 (1994).
239. See id.
240. Unital Ltd. v. Sleepco Mfg., Ltd., 627 F. Supp. 285, 288 (W.D. Wash. 1985)
(citation omitted).
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Act are separate from the underlying trademark that Congress in-
tended to protect.241 In the new 15 U.S.C. § 1125(d)(1)(A)(IX),
which was not present in the bill originally passed by the Sen-
ate,242 the language references "the mark incorporated in the per-
son's domain name registration."243 This sentence is one of the few
in the act that recognizes that the underlying trademark is in fact
separate from the domain name in question. By otherwise ignor-
ing this distinction, the ACPA effectively grants a trademark
holder the right to control the use of the textual equivalent of its
mark, the word itself, at least as a domain name. 244
The ACPA encourages domain name registrars to cancel regis-
trations "identical to, confusingly similar to, or dilutive of another's
mark."245 This gives a trademark owner the ability to cancel any
domain name registration that is textually identical to his trade-
mark, or that is even close to or sounds like his trademark.246 The
owner can do so simply by notifying the domain name registry of
the offending registration. Since the registrar is effectively im-
mune from liability if it complies with the trademark owner's re-
quest, there is no incentive for them to be conservative in
interpreting whether the domain name is similar to the trade-
mark.247 This allows the trademark owner to control the use of
domain names that are close to the textual equivalent of the trade-
mark. In other words, they can control the use of the word itself,
within the context of Internet domain names. The owner can even
control the use of similar words, by requesting the cancellation of a
domain name that could be textually "confused" with his own
trademark.
Traditional trademark law provided a check on this type of
ownership of words. By specifically requiring a likelihood of confu-
sion between the goods in question, the Lanham Act assured that
infringement would only be found when the public would be con-
241. See H.R. Rep. No. 106-412, at 5 (1999); S. Rep. 106-140, at 4 (1999).
242. See S. 1255, 106th Cong. § 3 (1999).
243. Anticybersquatting Consumer Protection Act of 1999, Pub. L. No. 106-113,
§ 3002, 113 Stat. 1501, 1501A-546 (1999) (to be codified at 15 U.S.C.
§ 1125(d)(1)(B)(i)(IX)).
244. See Anticybersquatting Consumer Protection Act § 3002, 113 Stat. 1501,
1501A-546 (to be codified at 15 U.S.C. § 1125(d)(1)(A)(ii)(I)-(II)).
245. Id. § 3004, 113 Stat. 1501, 1501A-549 (to be codified at 15 U.S.C.
1114(D)(ii)(II)).
246. See id.
247. See id.
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fused as to the origin of the goods. 248 The similarity of the text of
the marks is merely a factor for a court to consider. Hence, the
ACPA grants trademark owners new rights to control the use of
their trademarks in cyberspace that far exceed the protections
granted under traditional trademark law.
V. CONCLUSION
The fact that the Internet is "a unique and wholly new me-
dium of worldwide human communication"249 does not necessarily
justify the creation of unique and wholly new rights for trademark
holders. The ACPA does precisely that. It grants a trademark
owner the right to control the use of the textual identity of the
mark itself so long as the offending use is the registration of a do-
main name that is similar to the textual equivalent of the mark
itself. No corresponding right exists in any other context under
modern trademark law. This can have the effect of stifling both
commercial and personal free speech by restricting a competitor or
commentator from using a portion of a trademark within a domain
name to help the public locate his commentary or commercial page.
In addition, by eliminating the consideration of the infringing
parties' use of a mark in commerce and the provision that the
ACPA be applied without concern for the goods or services of the
parties, allows for a finding of infringement for domain name regis-
trations in situations that would be non-infringing uses under any
other application of trademark law. This shifting of trademark
protections away from the consumers and toward the trademark
owners will likely stifle Internet commerce and speech. This is a
far cry from Congress's recited intention: to "protect consumers,
promote the continued growth of electronic commerce, and protect
the goodwill of American businesses."250
Gregory B. Blasbalg
248. See 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a)(1)(A) (1994) (A person is liable in a civil action for
trademark infringement when he uses a trademark in a way which "is likely to
cause confusion... as to the origin, sponsorship, or approval of his or her goods.").
249. Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844 (1997).
250. S. Rep. No. 106-140, at 7 (1999).
